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THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO EDUCATION IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES"
Gary S. Fields
January, 1973

In the last few years, many less developed countries have suddenly
and apparently to their surprise found themselves with too many (relative
to the absorptive capac~ty of the ~onomy) rather than too few workers
with intermediate educational attainments.

Yet, even as surpluses of

educated workers grow larger and larger, the school systems continue to
expand and the people continue to demand education.

Elsewhere,

1

we have

sought to understand the persistence of a high demand for education in
countries characterized by a substantial surplus of educated labor.

In

this paper, we construct a political model of the allocation of resources
to education in less developed countries to try to explain why educational
systems continue to grow in the face of such surpluses.
The specific plan of the paper is as follows. We begin in Section 1
by summarizing some of the available evidence on educational and labor
market phenomena in less developed countries in order to give the reader
a feeling for the problems and issues involved.

Then, in Section 2, we

consider and then tentatively reject a social cost-benefit explanation
for educational expansion. As an alternative, in Section 3, we offer a
political model whereby more schools are constructed so long as the private

·'·
0

This paper is based on sections of Gary S. Fields, A Theorv of Edu_cation and Labor Markets in Less Developed Countries, Un~ublished Doctoral
Dissertation, Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
1972.
1

Fields (1972).
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demand for education exceeds the supply. Section 4 describes the path of
adjustment toward and nature of equilibrium as predicted by our model.
Finally, we conclude by considering some welfare and policy implications
of the analysis.

1.

The Labor Market Background of the Growth of School Systems
If the citizens, politicians, and students of less developed coun

tries were asked to name the issues of greatest interest and concern to
them, the employment problem and educational policy would probably rank
high on most lists. The reasons for the concern with the employment prob
lem in less developed countries are several.

From the individual's point

of view, a good job is seen as the road to success, whether measured in
terms of high wages, favorable working conditions, or status and prestige.
To academicians and policy-makers, the lack of employment opportunities
wastes human resources, hinders the rate of economic growth, and has un
favorable social and personal consequences.

And the political power

structure, perceiving massive unemployment and underemployment as threaten
ing the security of their positions of leadership. seek to protect them
selves by effecting employment-creating measures. For these reasons, it
is not surprising that policies to promote emoloyment have been actively
encouraged and often implemented.
If increased employment is a popular goal, educational investment is
a popular means of trying to achieve it.

A common belief

in the last

decade was the notion that unemployment in the less developed countries
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was largely of a structural nature due to the apparent shortage of skilled
manpower.

1

It was felt that by increasing a country's stock of skilled

manpower, the newly-educated would fill high-level manpower vacancies and
extra unskilled laborers would be employed to complement the additional
skilled manpower.

In this way, increased investment in higher levels of

education would help to increase employment and accelerate economic growth.
Educational investment was also urged at the lower levels, although
only partly for employment-related reasons. While economists tended to
advocate the spread of primary or secondary education for its presumed role
in increasing worker productivity (especially in agriculture), others
stressed the possibility of spreading desirable social values and skills
through the schools and the potential of the educational system as a
vehicle for social mobility and an equalizer of opportunity.
The people also urged large-scale investments in schoolin~. Citizens
saw education as providing themselves and their children with the qualifi
cations needed for the best jobs; the more schooling spaces, the greater
the likelihood of a particular child securing the necessary credentials.
As long as more persons wanted to attend school than the number of spaces
available, there was an excess demand

2

for education and political pressure

to expand the educational system.
By promoting an expansionary educational policy, elected politicians
could appear to supportthe consensus development strategy and represent
the wishes of their constituents and thereby remain in everyone's favor.
1

The general mood of the time is conveyed in Harbison and Myers (1964-).

2

It is in the sense of families seeking to have their children
educated that we shall talk about the demand for education. i-1ore specifi
cally, throughout this paper, we shall use the term "demand for education"
to mean the number of persons who would like (or whose parents wish them)
to be enrolled in school under existing conditions and who are able to
pay the direct costs of schooling.
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The result of the interaction between the strong popular demand for
education and the acquiescenc e of the educational planners was the so-called
11

111 of the Sixties.
education explosion

Table 1 may give some insight into the magnitude of the growth of
school systems in the less developed countries.

Primary school enrollments

increased by about 5% per year as many countries moved closer to the goal
of universal primary education.

The largest rates of increase--a bout 10%

per year on average--we re at the secondary and post-second ary levels.

In

large part, this was motivated by the desire to make up "skilled manpower
shortages" as quickly as possible. An additional factor of considerabl e
significanc e in the newly-indep endent African countries was the wish to re
place colonialist s l:y locals, both in the civil service and in the private
sector.
It is important to realize that in most less developed countries the
schools and colleges are constructed , operated, and financed largely by the
central government, as opposed to either local governments or private or
ganizations . Furthermore , the amount of financial aid to students is not
trivial, since students in primary and secondary education are generally
charged only a small fraction of the costs of their schooling and higher
education is frequently entirely subsidized.

As a result, educational ex

penditure is probably the largest single item in the budgets of most less
developed countries. Since governments are the largest single source of
development finance, educational policies may have important consequence s
for overall development strategy.
1

The term "education ex-plosion" was popularized by Bereday and
Lauwerys ( 196 5 ) •
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Table 1

Average Annual Rate of Growth of School Enrollments

Primary

Secondary

Higher

Total

6.5%
4.1%

11.3%
9.3%

10.9%
6.0%

7.1%
4.8%

Avg. % 1960-65
Avg. % 1965-68

5.1%
5.5%

11.5%
9.7%

9.5%
12.0%

6.1%
6.3%

Avg. % 1960-65
Avg. % 1965-68

5.5%
5.2%

11.8%
9.7%

6.0%
5.0%

Africa

Avg. % 1960-65
Avg. % 1965-68
Latin America

Aisa

Source;

7.6%
3.4%

UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1970, pp. 62-67.
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In contrast to the skilled manpower shortages of the last decade, the
school systems in many less developed countries are now producing many more
school leavers

1

than can be absorbed into employment.

plus school leavers is not a new one.

The problem of sur-

India has had it for years, and the

now classic article by Callaway (1963) pointed out this phenomenon in
Africa ten years ago. What is new is the scope.
What happens to the surplus educated workers?

Some thoughtthat they

would all have been inculcated by the schooling process itself with a strong
aversion to manual labor and would choose to be unemployed more or less per
manantly while searching for the most desirable and rewarding jobs.
evidence is that this is not now the case.

2

The

Examination of occupation-educa

tion profiles of the labor forces of less developed countries shows clearly
that large numbers of highly-educated workers actually do accept lower-level
• b

JO S.

3

However, many of the surplus educated are in fact unemployed.

Using

the standard Western definition of unemployment (actively looking for work
but without it), the available evidence suggests a general pattern which is
perhaps surprising:

unemployment rates are highest for persons with inter

mediate educational attainment. Complete education-unemployment profiles for
seven less developed countries reveal that with one exception (Colombia) the
incidence of unemployment is highest among primary and secondary school leavers
as compared with the uneducated and persons with higher education. (See Table 2)
1 "School leaver" is a British term denoting a completer of a particular
level of schooling. Contrary to American parlance, "dropping out" is not
implied.
2

See, for instance, Myrdal (1968).

3

See OECD (1969).
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Education and Unemployment, Selected Countries

Colombia, Bogota
April 1967
Total labor force:
Males
Females

12 or more
years
education

6 to 11
years
education

l to 5
years
education

Illiterate

I'

11. 5%
4.1%

14.9%
16.3%

15.3%
22.0%

13.2%
11.3%

I

Primary

Illiterate

lI Secondard

Post
secondary

!;

Argentina, Buenos
Aires
1965
Total labor force
Venezuela, 1969
Urban areas:
Total labor force

;'
l
j

!

3.8%

'-1-. 3%

4.3%

7.0%

l Illiterate

3.3%

10.2%

2.3%
Graduates

Below matri-l Matriculation
culation
'
'

'

India, 1960/61Urban areas:
Total labor force

:

5.7%

j

;

!

'

''

2.7%

1.2%

'

7.0%

2.8%

Ordinary
Certification

Higher
Certificate
and above

'

Secondary, :
Grades
5 to 8

hliterate
~nd Primary
~rades l-4
I

Ceylon, 1963
Urban areas:
Total labor force

!

2.3%

11.8%

7.3%

7.1%

I

Primary

Uliterate

i

'

Higher
Certificate
and above

Secondary
grades
I to IV

!

Malaya, 1965
Urban areas
Total labor force
15-24
Male
Female

!

i

10.4%
17.2%
Illiterate

I

19.5%
32.4%

30.9%
69.7%

15.5%
27.5%

Literate

Elementary
to Secondary

Graduate

5.2%

11. 7%

I

Syria, 1967
All areas:
Total Labor force

4.3%

I

4.4%
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2.

Social Returns to Investment in Education in Less Developed Countries
We have observed that school systems in many less developed countries

are producing too many highly-educated workers relative to the absorptive
capacity of their economies. Some surplus educated are found entering lower
level occupations and others are experiencing considerable unemployment.
This pattern raises a new set of questions for assessing the social desira
bility of additional educational investment.
If we agree, at least in principle, that social costs and benefits
should be given serious weight in social decisions regarding the allocation
of resources to education, we must ask:

"What sort of work is the marginal

gnaduate going to do, given that there is already a surplus of educated per
sons, and what kinds of benefits (economic and other) will society receive?"
We must also ask: "What does it cost to educate another graduate?

Do the

benefits justify the costs?"
These questions may be summarized by a marginal social rate of return,
which may be defined as that rate which sets the discounted stream of ad
ditional social benefits attributable to the schooling of the last person
educated equal to the cost incurred by society of educating him. Nobody to
my knowledge has actually computed such a marginal social rate of return.
Significantly, however, where a similar measure (a shadow rate of return)
has been constructed and compared with the average social rate of return
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as conventionally measured, the results changed dramatically. For our
purposes, the most interesting conclusion of the study by Psacharopoulos
(1970) is:

"In the case of

Greece, investment priorities with respect

to investment in skills estimated on the basis of observed labor earnings
would have suggested a change in the wrong direction
output."

of the educational

(Emphasis added.)

It may well be that in countries characterized by a surplus of
educated labor, the marginal social rate of return to education might be
very small or even negative despite generally high "social rate of
return,"

1

As we shall argue below, the marginal social costs (in real

terms) are positive and frequently large and the marginal social bene
fits might often be quite small, even though the average benefit may be
large.

This gap between the average and marginal social benefit from

investment in education may cause the marginal social rate of return to
be much less than the average rates reported by Psacharopoulos and Hinchliffe.
Let us now consider the social costs and benefits in some detail.

1 Psacharopoulos and Hinchliffe (1971) summarize social rate of
return studies for fifteen less developed countries. Only for primary
education in the Philippines and higher education in Kenya and Colombia
were the reported rates less than ten percent.
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Social Costs
In economies with surplus educated labor, the social costs of
education may be very large.

Typically, such economies have a large

and perhaps redundant supply of unskilled and uneducated labor, with
severe shortages of

both physical and human capital.

The educational

system is a large user of both human and non-human capital.

A glance

at the capital budgets, wage bills of teachers, and number of teacher
training spaces relative to education for other occupations confirms
.

.

view.
h
tis

1

Thus, the resources devoted to producing education are

extremely valuable in light of the important alternative uses to which
they could be put.

2

1

For instance, in Kenya, about two-thirds of the approximately 11,000
post-secondary students (excluding those at foreign universities)
are enrolled in teacher education courses. Education accounts for 15%
of the Kenya government's budget and 10% of its development expenditures.
Personal emoluments to teaching and non-teaching staff in schools amounted
to blO million, which is 8% of the total government budget. Source:
Fields (1971).
2

In private discussions on this point, some persons have taken exception
to the view that the educational system is a large user of capital with
valuable alternative uses. It is pointed out that with respect to human
capital, in some countries, many teachers are themselves only generally
educated secondary school graduates of whom there is a surplus. With
respect to physical capital, the resources used to construct schools
might simply not be supplied otherwise, To the extent that labor is
especially volunteered and physical materials are gathered or made or
foreign governments or international agencies construct educational
facilities, the real resource cost of educational expansion may be quite
small. My response to the first counter-argument is that although the
school leavers employed as teachers might have been unutilized otherwise,
this in no way negates the fact that valuable governmental budgetary
resources are diverted from other possible uses to pay their salaries.
With regard to the second counter-argument, although some country schools
are literally built by the townspeople, these schools often encounter
financial difficulties after the initial enthusiasm wanes. Furthermore,
the construction of higher educational facilities by an outside body fre
quently commits a country to larger recurrent expenditures than it can
reasonably afford. On this point, see Heller (1971).
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Another substantial component of the social costs of education is the
financial aid granted to students.

In many less-developed countries, stu

dents in secondary and post-secondary education pay none or only a small
fraction of the costs of their education, receive housing and other payments
in kind, and in addition may receive a small cash living allowance.

If the

government's budget is relatively flexible, this is merely a transfer of
purchasing power from taxpayers to students to enable them to pay the costs
of their schooling. But if the government's budget is more or less fixed in
the short run, the value of the financial aid is represented in real terms
by the social welfare which would be realized if the money were used on the
next best public projects.
In contrast to economies which have shortages or full employment of
educated workers, the output foregone by having potentially-productive workers
in school in economies with surplus educated labor is minimal.

If uneducated

persons are temporarily withdrawn from the labor force while in school and
there are others available to fill the jobs they would have held, there
would be a loss of output only to the extent that the persons selected for
further education are more productive on the job than those who replace
them.
Social Benefits
At the risk of oversimplification, it would seem useful to distinguish
three arguments which have been used to justify social investment in education.
First, educational investment is seen, mainly by economists, as a
desirable means of promoting economic development.

There are two distinct
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versions of this argument. Some contend that educational investment pro
duces additional high-level manpower which is in short supply.

The manpower

needs which are filled as the newly-educated are employed may alleviate
bottlenecks to economic growth or expansion of lower-level employment.
Thus, educational investment is sometimes justified on grounds of multi
plier effects.

However, this argument is of little relevance in countries
which already have an excess of educated workers. 1
A second economic argument, used mainly in favor of investment in
lower levels of schooling, is that education creates human capital which
is as necessary to economic growth and development as roads and other
types of social overhead capital.

This would be the case if education makes

workers more productive in the work they do. For instance, by this line of
reasoning, literate farmers are better farmers, highly-educated clerks
and civil servants are more skilled and have better work habits and so are
more productive on the job, etc.

If the surplus of educated persons re-

. sults in widespread absorption of relatively well-educated workers in lower
level jobs, the productivity effects of education may be quite important.
That large productivity effects from education do in fact result is more a
matter of faith than of empirical verification.

In the absence of convin

cing evidence that educated workers are significantly more productive than

1A variant of
this position is that it is necessary to produce
a surplus of educated persons today so that there will be enough in
the future to fill all the new skilled jobs in growing economies. As
a counter-argume nt, we note that generally the rate of increase of the
educated labor force far exceeds the rate of growth of skilled employ
ment.
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their uneducated counterparts in the same kinds of jobs, one cannot help
but be skeptical about the importance of this argument. 1
Third, investment in education is sometimes justified on grounds of
social development. It is alleged that education inculcates the citizenry with
desirable social values, produces national and community leaders, and creates
a populace which is better able to enjoy leisure and the so-called good things
of life. A thorough consideration of this point is well beyond the scope of
the present discussion.

Suffice it to say that reliance on this argument begs

the question of whether it is worthwhile to devote scarce economic resources
to the production of education, which would then best be regarded as a public
consumer good whose benefits are incapable of measurement.
Social Returns
We have seen that when there are surplus educated workers as is the case
in many less developed countries the costs of providing additional education
are likely to be large and the incremental benefits small.

If this is correct,

the (marginal) social rate of return to additional educational investment at
these levels would be low and would argue against educating so many. Thus, the
continued expansion of educational systems which we observe in the face of in
adequate absorption of educated workers in the labor market does not seem to
be explained adequately by considerations of the economic benefits to society.
Some other explanation must be sought.
1
There are a number of reasons why employers might continue to hire the
educated preferentially, even if their education did not make them more pro
ductive. One factor is the selection for schools. In general, opportunities
for continuing one's schooling are few and only the highest scorers on examina
tions are able to continue on to the next level. To the extent that this reflects
ability (as opposed, for instance, to the financial capacity of parents to hire
private tutors) and this ability increases one's productivity on the job, edu
cational attainment may (on average) serve as a useful signalling device for
employers. Second, there may be non-pecuniary reasons (such as more stimulating
lunchtime conversation) why employers might prefer to hire the better-educated.
Finally, relatively well-educated employers may establish an unnecessarily high
"objective" hiring criterion such as educational attainment to justify their own
high salaries and ward off possible threats to their job security from the less
educated.
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3. A Political Interpretation of the Supply of Education
We postulate that the neducation explosion" in many less developed
countries has a simple political explanation.

In light of the presumed

low marginal social rates of return, optimal education policy would
dictate the contraction of school systems.

This would free scarce

capital for investment or for the production of non-educationa l output
and also lower the cost of financial aid to students, thereby reducing
the pressure on the government's budgetary resources or on taxpayers.
However, there may be important political forces exerting pres
sure for a larger educational establishment.

These include parents who

want more education for their children, teachers' unions with a large
vested interest in the size of th~ educational establishment, and
employers who wish to hire the relatively well-educated. Each of these
groups would be perfectly rational in considering the private gains they
would expect to realize from a larger educational system in relation
to the private costs and expressing their views in the political arena.
For obvious reasons, teachers and employers would expect to gain more
from a larger educational system than it would cost them.
about ordinary citizens?

But what

There are at least four reasons why they

might want a large educational system.

(1) They may be near-sighted

and fail to connect lower output of other public goods or higher taxes
with a large educational system.

(2) Even if they correctly perceive

the costs, each parent may be over-optimistic about the likelihood that
his particular child will be admitted to the next level of schooling.
(3) Even if there are no misperceptions of costs or likelihood of re
ceiving benefits, parents may be gamblers and be willing to take risks
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(i.e., pay higher taxes) even if there is only a small chance of receiving
the high private return, which is conditional upon his child being able
to go on.

1

(4) Finally, even if parents are not gamblers, investment in

education in less developed countries yields very high private returns
despite substantial unemployment and underemployment amongst the educated,
and a space in school therefore has a large monetary value. As we have
noted earlier, educational systems in less developed countries typically
are heavily if not entirely subsidized so that the private costs are
small.

Furthermore, each step in the educational ladder roughly doubles

one's lifetime earnings.

As a consequence, private rates of return to

investment in education in less developed countries generally are on
the order of 20% per year or more.

2

For all these reasons, there is cause to believe that a demand for
education in excess of the supply is a politically unstable situation.
It would seem that given the political nature of the demand for educa
tion and the strength of feeling behind it, rather than contracting school
systems in response to low social returns, politicians could help
· ·
· positions
secure t h eir

3 b
.
.
d"irection
.
h e opposite
.
·
an d using
int
y moving

their influence to expand the school system.

Hence, we postulate a

simple adjustment process, namely, that supply adjusts according to
the relation

1

An interesting bit of evidence along these lines is the reaction
of parents in former British colonies to the proposed replacement of
the traditional British curriculum by a program emphasizing vocational
and agricultural education. The parents apparently felt that such a
curriculum would effectively exclude their children from university
and were unwilling to risk not winning the big payoff.
2
3

See Psacharopoulos and Hinchliffe (1971).

This is sometimes expressed negatively: that failure to expand
educational opportunities is tantamount to political suicide.
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(1)

ts= n(D - s),

n < 1

i.e., at any point in time, the number of new schooling spaces being
built

(tS) is some fraction n of the difference between demand (D) and

supply (S).

The coefficient of adjustment may be assumed to vary

positively with society's taste for education, positively with the
level of national income, and negatively with the cost of constructing
and operating schools. In short, what we have is teachers, employers,
and ordinary citizens facing one set of signals --- high private rates
of return --- and the political system responding to those same private
signals while the social rate of return to additional educational
investment may be quite small.

4. Demand and Supply of Education and the Nature of Equilibrium
If the supply of education is determined politically in the manner
just described, when does expansion end?

From the supply adjustment

relations (1), it is clear that our political model implies that the
supply of education stops changing only if the demand and supply of
education are equal.
( 2)

D

The condition

= S ~ tS = 0

is thus necessary for static equilibrium in the market for education.
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This condition 6S = 0 is not sufficient for a stable equilibrium . Viewed in
a dynamic context, anything that.would systematica lly alter the demand for
education would also disrupt any static equilibrium in which condition (2)
may have been temporarily satisfied.

In particular, the stock of persons

being educated today corresponds to the inflow of educated persons into the
labor force tomorrow.

Unless the inflow is exactly equal to the outflow of

educated persons on account of death or retirement, the size of the educated
labor force will change. This will alter employment conditions and change
the private rate of return and the quantity of education demanded.
Changes in other economic variables would have the effect of shifting
the entire demand for education schedule. These factors include net popu
lation growth, changes in the skilled-uns killed relative wage ratio, non
neutral technologic al change, and changes in the composition of the relative
demand for workers of different educational attainments . We shall hold these
factors constant and consider in a partial analysis the path of adjustment
to equilibrium .
The change in the educated labor force (6LE) is the inflow of newly
educated persons (S) minus the outB.ow from the labor force, which is the
dropout rate (6) times the educated labor force (LE):
(3)

6L

E = S - oL.
E

In order to keep employment conditions constant, LE must remain unchanged.
Thus, the condition
(4)

S = oL

E

+-+

6L

E

= 0

is necessary for dynamic equilibrium in the market for education.
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When condition (2) is satisfied, there is no tendency for the
supply of education to change. Similarly, when (4) is satisfied, under
the conditions described above, there is no tendency for demand to change.
Therefore, (2) and (4) together constitute a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for a stable equilibrium in the market for educa
tion.
Let us consider an economy which initially has an excess demand for
\

education (disequilibrium in the education market) and which is experiencing a growing surplus of educated workers (disequilibrium in the
labor market).

Such an economy is illustrated in Figure 1.

excess demand for education is the gap between D0 and

s0 •

1

The initial

The existence

of a growing surplus of educated workers is illustrated by the inflow
to the educated labor force (S ) lying above the outflow (oLE).
0

1 rn Figure 1, the demand for education is drawn as a downward
sloping function of the number of persons educated. This shape is consis
tent with either flexible or rigid wages. If wage rates are flexible,
this shape may be explained by the fact that an additional supply of
education lowers the wage received by educated workers, which in turn
lowers the private rate of return to investment in education. If instead
wages are considered to be fixed, the intuitive justification for the
downward-sloping relation is that a larger number of, say, university
graduates in the labor market lowers the expected income of each by re
ducing the probability that any particular one will be the next highly
paid university president. Elsewhere, I have shown that under several
alternative labor market constructs, the demand for education would not
be expected to decline smoothly (see "The Private Demand for Education
in Relation to Labor Market Conditions in Less Developed Countries").
However, the monotonically declining relation in Figure 1 eases exposition
without affecting the nature of the final equilibrium or the process of
adjustment to it.
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D, S

Figure 1.
The Supply and Demand for Education and Adjustment to Equilibrium.
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Because the demand for education is greater than the supply,
by (1), the political mechanism would cause the educational system
to expand.

The fact that the number of new entrants to theeducated

labor force is greater than the outflow due to death and retirement
implies, by (3), that LE is increasing.

In the rigid wage case, this

lowers the probability of finding a skilled job.

In the flexible

wage case, the wage actually paid to educated workers is reduced.
in either circumstance, the demand for education will fall.

Thus,

The growing

supply of education and falling demand for it are shown in Figure l by
the respective positive and negative slopes of the Sand D curves.
Since the difference between demand and supply is narrowing, the change
in supply gets smaller as the number of persons educated increases.
Therefore, the supply increases at a diminishing rate, illustrated by
the flattening of the supply function between

sO

and A.

the demand and supply of education are equal and ~S =

o.

At point A,

-21-

In the past, some writers (including myself) have looked only
as far as A.

Although this point satisfies the condition for a static

equilibrium in the market for education (2), it is not a dynamically
stable equilibrium.

This is because at A the number of newly-educated

workers is greater than the number leaving the labor force.

Thus, the

educated labor force (LE) is growing, which implies a systematic
rightward tendency and a continued deterioration in the labor market
prospects for educated workers.

As a result, the demand for education

will fall beneath the supply, creating excess capacity in the schools and
leading to a reduction in their number. 1
adjustment (n
and B).

<

Since there is only partial

1), the supply contracts slowly at first (between A

The excess supply increases and reaches a maximum (at BF), after

which supply decreases faster than demand,until such time as the supply
of education equals the number of dropouts from the educated labor force
(S = oLE) at point C.

At this point, the inflow of newly-educated

workers into the labor force exactly equals the outflow on account of
death and retirement, which satisfies condition (4) for equilibrium in
the education market.

However, at

CJ

the supply of education exceeds

the demand; therefore, condition (2) is not satisfied and the supply of
education is contracted.

As a consequence, there are not enough newly

educated to replace labor force dropouts, which means that the educated
labor force contracts.

We therefore move southwestward on the graph,

approaching a stable equilibrium at E, where the supply and demand
for education are again equal and the flows into and out of the educated
labor force are also equal.

1 The financial
difficulties of many colleges and universities in the
United States at the present time may foreshadow just such a contraction
as the result of an overproduction of graduates relative to job opportunities.
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The analysis may be amended to take into account the possibility
that in addition to altering the supply of education•in response
an excess demand for schooling

to

spaces, politicians may also seek to

'

reduce the excess demand by altering the parameters which enter into
the individual's computations of private costs and benefits.

This might

be done by raising the private cost of education by means of increased
school fees, by lowering the benefits by reducing the size of the edu
cated-uneducate d earnings differential by means of an incomes policy,
by erecting capital market barriers to prevent potential students from
raising the requisite funds, or by lowering the entire demand for educa
tion function by ceasing to stimulate people's tastes for education.
Two demand for education curves are shown in Figure 2.

Curve D is
1

constructed on the assumption of given costs, wage differentials, capital
market conditions, and tastes. Curve D2 assumes that politicians act
to reduce the demand for education in any or all of the ways mentioned
above.

By tracing a supply adjustment mechanism of the type shown in

Figure 1, it can easily be shown that D2 would lead to a lower peak supply
and lower equilibrium supply than D1 •
D .

Figure 2.
Demand for Education Functions With and Without Changes in Private Cost
and Benefit Conditions.
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The most noteworthy feature of the interaction between privately
motivated demand for education and politically-determined supply is that,
as equilibrium is approached, school systems would be expected at first
to expand, although a halt or even contraction may be anticipated later.
It might well be asked what it is about our model which moves the economy
toward equilibrium in this roundabout way.

If the ultimate equilibrium

is at E, why would vote-maximizing politicians not anticipate the future
direction and simply move directly there?

The answer to this is that

they are maximizing votes at the time and if they get too far ahead of
the electorate they would lose voter support.

What we have here is a

situation which in a formal sense closely resembles the behavior
postulated in physical capital models and which embodies many of the
same stock-flow complications.

Even if I have reason to believe that

there will be a business downturn five years hence and I will then
require a smaller capital stock than I now have, it would not make sense
for me to disinvest now if I also anticipate a boom over the next few
years.

In like manner, politicians probably see the current excess

demand for education and respond to that and will worry about surplus
school spaces when and .if the situation arises.

Far from being myopic,

they seem to have the best chance of being in office in the future if
they take steps to increase their current popularity.

As in physical

capital models in which rational maximizing behavior leads to marked
cycles in inventory investment,

1

so maximizing behavior in our human

capital model leads us to expect first an increase and then a reduction
in human capital investment.

1 See,for instance, Lovell (1964).
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The fact that adjustment to equilibrium leads first to an expansion
and then a contraction of school systems gives us reason to believe that
the education explosion is not a permanent feature in less developed
countries.

The apparent slowing of rates of growth of school systems

in Africa and Asia and the virtual constancy in Latin America during the
latter Sixties (See Table 1) are consistent with the pattern predicted
by our model.

Despite this predicted trend, the slowdown may nonethe-

less take a long time and entail a costly overcommitment of resources to
education in the meantime.

Furthermore, demand-reducing policies which

limit the availability of education to the poorest segments of the popula
tion could also be introduced in the interim, with important implications for
the distribution of income. In the final section, we consider some
consequences of these and other predictions of our model.
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5.

Conclusion
In this paper, we have suggested that the allocation of resources

to education in less developed countries should be viewed as the result
of political decisions rather than as the outcome of any sort of social
cost-benefit calculation.

Such an allocative process has three impor

tant consequences for the development paths of the countries involved.
First, educational supply decisions in less developed countries do
not seem to reflect any sort of conscious social choice as to what is
the best use of a country's scarce resources.

While one may question

whether a social rate of return is a meaningful guide to educational
decisions, there can be little disagreement about the inadequacy of an
allocative mechanism which does not seek to weigh the social gains from
education in relation to the social costs of supplying it. Yet, the
political model we have proposed in this paper is exactly such a mechanism.
Educational decisions in less developed countries are apparently made
with reference to private costs and benefits. Since there is reason to
believe that these diverge sharply from the social costs and benefits, it
is hard to imagine that decisions made in this way would turn out to be
optimal in any sense.
Second, the political model we have proposed leads us to expect an
expansion of the schooling system in the short run despite unemployment
and underemployment amongst the educated.

The importance of this lies

in the fact that governments in the less developed countries are the major
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source of national savings and investment. Any additional competing claims
on governmental budgets ~ould likely divert resources from important and
socially profitable public projects, thereby reducing savings and invest
ment and leading to a slower rate of economic growth.

Thus, the allocation

of resources to education by political forces raises important questions
of efficic ::'.;cy.
0

Third, the political forces we have described also have important
consequences for the distribution of income. We J:av.e noted that the political
response to an excess demand for education would not only be to take
steps to raise the supply closer to the private demand but also to take
action to lessen the demand.

One such action might be to reduce the

expected private benefits of education by narrowing the skilled-unskill ed
wage differential, either through higher taxes or a slower rate of growth
of upper-level incomes.

A lower wage would be expected to lead to more

jobs and more output, provided there are no strongly adverse effects on
worker efficiency or turnover.

Not only would we expect there to be a

larger pie to divide but we might ?'easonably expect it to be divided among
more people.

However, contrary to this seemingly beneficial effect, there

might well be other and less favorable outcomes of demand-reducing policies.
Higher school fees, erection of (or failure to remove) capital market
barriers, and measures to shift people's tastes for education would all
act to limit the private demand for education.

And it would be the poor

people who, for reasons that such diverse economists as Becker (1967) and
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Bowles (1971) seem to agree on, would be hit the hardest.

Since

education is of great importance in determining one's income position
in a less developed country, the new incentive structure and opportunities
for acquiring education would, by making education prohibitively costly
to the children of the poor, tend to perpetuate existing income inequali
ties and maintain the position of those at the top.
These considerations suggest the need, both on efficiency and on
distributional grounds, to fundamentally change the process by which re
sources are allocated to education in less developed countries.

These

choices ought not to be made by politicians whose very tenure in office
depends on satisfying popular demands.

Instead, the power to make decisions

on educational matters should be transferred to a body which is relatively
insulated from political pressure.

One such possibility might be a

government educational planning board with actual decision-making authority.
In any case, when one considers the potentially harmful effects on growth
and income distribution if resources continue to be allocated to education
in the present manner, there is cause for concern.
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